



KPAF Mi-2 helicopter conducting relief operations for flood victims during July 2010. (KCNA)

In This Issue

Mi-2 HOPLITE IN KPAF Service.....	1
KPA Lessons Learned from Foreign Conflicts	2
Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok.....	6
Vice Marshal Yi Tu-ik.....	7
Editor's Notes	8
Endnotes.....	9

Mi-2 HOPLITE in KPAF Service ¹

By Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

During the late 1970s-early 1980s the Korean People's Air Force (KPAF) purchased an initial shipment of 60 Mi-2 HOPLITE light utility helicopters from the Polish manufacturer PZL. It subsequently purchased additional batches of Mi-2s and now operates an estimated total of 140 of these helicopters. Within the KPAF the Mi-2 is known as the Hyokshin-2. Reports state that the Mi-2 has been produced within the DPRK, however, this appears to be somewhat inaccurate. Rather, it is believed that PZL manufactured Mi-2 helicopters were sold to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in "knock-down" form and assembled in

country.² Some of these Mi-2s have been subsequently modified to perform additional roles (e.g., assault).

Within the KPAF these helicopters serve in a number of different roles: attack, liaison, training, transportation and VIP transport. In the attack role the Mi-2 is modified to standards similar to that of the Mi-2US or Mi-2RN armed with various combinations of 23mm cannon, machine guns, rocket packs and antitank guided missiles (ATGM). The KPAF may also operate a small number of Mi-2s in the electronic warfare/jamming role, however, this remains unconfirmed.

During wartime Mi-2s configured in this role will operate with KPAF's two sniper brigades to conduct assaults upon U.S. and Republic of Korea Air Force airbases. Mi-2s will likely be assigned to work with Korean People's Army (KPA) airborne brigades conducting counterinsurgency operations.

The KPAF is believed to operate one Mi-2 regiment (with 28-45 Mi-2s), four Mi-2/-4/-8 regiments (each with 18-28 Mi-2s) and a small number of flights used for liaison duties and training (e.g., with KPAF sniper brigades and KPA airborne brigades).

Both the Mi-2 and Mi-4 HOUND are occasionally seen



Propaganda photo showing a KPAF Mi-2 helicopter delivering supplies during the 1980s. Note what appear to be warning stripes on the tail rotor. The "선물" on the box means "a gift."

in propaganda photographs and films showing them delivering supplies or assisting civilians (e.g., transporting a pregnant mother on an offshore island to a hospital, etc.) during floods, winter emergencies and other natural disasters.³ Although floods are not unusual within the DPRK, those that occurred during August 2010 have been some of the most severe in decades. According to footage released by the DPRK the KPA and KPAF were called in to assist with relief efforts, and Mi-2s were being utilized to transport supplies into areas isolated by the floods.

A small, robust, easily to maintain, light helicopter the Mi-2 will undoubtedly remain in KPAF inventory for the foreseeable future.

KPA Lessons Learned from Foreign Conflicts 1960-Present, Part I

By Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Background

Contrary to the popularly held view that the Kim Il-sung (when he was alive), Kim Chong-il and the Korean People's Army (KPA) leadership are unwilling or unable to learn from foreign military developments, there is a considerable body of evidence that they have conducted systematic historical and operational analysis to aid in the development of the KPA's force structure, weapons, tactics and doctrine.⁴ Apart from an underlying emphasis upon lessons learned

during the Fatherland Liberation War (i.e., Korean War) this analytical process focuses upon both the conflicts in which the U.S. has been involved since the 1960s and those in the Middle East and South Asia.

Within the KPA the General Staff Department's Military Training Bureau (a.k.a., Combat Training Bureau) is responsible for education and training. In coordination with Operations Bureau it establishes requirements and curricula for military schools and academies as well as yearly training requirements and schedules for the KPA, Reserve Military Training Units, Workers'-Peasants' Red Guard and Red Youth Guard. The Military Training Bureau is also responsible for compiling unit and military histories based upon the records of the Operations Bureau.

In fulfilling these missions, the Military Training Bureau conducts research and analysis of foreign combat operations through a small number of research institutes and think tanks. The most significant of these are the Research Institute for Military Sciences (a.k.a., Military Sciences Institute) and the Strategy Research Institute.⁵ These institutes are known to have conducted extensive historical research not only on World War II and the Fatherland Liberation

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War (i.e., Korean War), but more significantly on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran-Iraq War, Operations DESERT STORM, DESERT FOX and IRAQI FREEDOM, Operation ALLIED FORCE and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. They are known to have also conducted an intensive study of the process by which the *Nationale Volksarmee* (armed forces of the former German Democratic Republic) was dissolved and merged into the *Bundeswehr* (armed forces of the German Federal Republic).⁶ These institutes—most likely in cooperation with components of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences—also conduct research into foreign military science and the development of new weapon systems (esp., ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and precision guided munitions).⁷

Sources of information utilized by these research institutions include,

- Foreign media and other open sources—the growth of Internet access in the DPRK during the past 15 years has undoubtedly been of great value.
- KPA delegations and advisors sent abroad.
- Intelligence assets, defense attachés and embassy personnel in regions of interest.
- Delegations, trusted personnel and observers sent abroad on various commercial and personal assignments.
- Various formal and informal connections with international organizations (e.g., IAEA) and sub-national groups (e.g., Hezbollah, IRGC, etc.).

Using this body of work the research institutions produce “lessons learned” reports and makes proposals to the General Staff Department concerning training, tactics, development of weapon systems—but not doctrine.

Notably in this process is that the KPA does not generally accept any foreign interpretations of lessons learned, but utilizes raw data to create its own. It determines exactly what it means for the KPA and how it can be applied to the specific requirements on the Korean Peninsula. This characteristic dates back to 1966 and Kim Il-sung’s exhortation that,

*...In modernizing the KPA and developing military science and technology, we must fully consider the reality of our country with its numerous mountains and lengthy coastline.... We must develop and introduce military science and technology in accordance with the reality of our country and correctly incorporate old style weapons along with modern weapons.*⁸

While the lessons learned reports—some of which apparently reach the National Defense Commission—serve as the factual underpinnings for the formulation military doctrine neither the KPA’s research institutions nor Military Training Bureau are responsible for the development of doctrine. Rather it is a top-down decision-making process centered primarily upon Kim Chong-il and a few very close

advisors. By all accounts Kim is actively involved in the development of KPA doctrine and proceeds cautiously. He is also always concerned how KPA doctrinal changes might influence internal stability to avoid mistakes made by other leaders, (e.g., Saddam Hussein, Nicolae Ceausescu, etc.). Once a doctrinal change is made it is passed to the Military Training Bureau for implementation.

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962⁹

With the resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis in favor of the United States, Kim Il-sung and the KPA leadership saw the Soviet Union as having “given in” to the United States rather than risk a military confrontation. They questioned whether, despite the signing of a *Treaty of Peace and Friendship* during 1961, if the Soviet Union would come to the assistance of the DPRK in a renewed conflict. Understanding that answer to this question was likely to be “no” Kim Il-sung presented a new national military policy based upon self-defense and self-reliance known as the *Four Military Lines* which called for,

*“...the arming of the whole people, the fortification of the entire country, the training of all soldiers as a cadre force, and the modernization of arms.”*¹⁰

It is likely that the Cuban missile crisis was also a pivotal factor in Kim’s subsequent development of the *Three Revolutionary Forces*. The third of these revolutionary forces was the “international revolutionary force,” a term which both Kim Il-sung and Kim Chong-il would use to describe Cuba and Fidel Castro, Vietnam and Ho Chin Minh and other revolutionary and terrorist groups throughout the world.

It appears that Kim Il-sung’s thinking at the time was that if the Soviet Union would not come to its assistance than the DPRK needed to both develop strong relations with fellow revolutionaries throughout the world and support the rise of others. This led to both the DPRK’s policy of outreach to the non-aligned nations and its support for revolutionary and terrorist groups throughout the world.

Yemen Wars, 1962-1970 and 1994

From 1962 to 1970, a civil war took place in the Yemen Arab Republic between Royalists supported by Saudi Arabia and Republicans supported by Egypt and the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1960s in support of the Republican forces Egypt deployed large numbers of troops and the Egyptian Armed Forces conducted extensive combat operations. Included in these operations was the Egyptian use of chemical weapons (e.g., mustard gas) against Royalist troops.¹¹ This use of chemical weapons, combined with self-induced belief that such weapons were employed against them during the Fatherland Liberation War, may have influenced the direction of the KPA’s recently established chemical weapons program.¹²

During May-July 1994 another civil war broke out again between rival regional factions in Yemen. During the three-month conflict both sides launched a combined total of at least 67 ballistic missiles. Of these approximately 32 were Scud Bs launched by southern forces and 35 were SS-21s launched by northern forces. The KPA had taken a keen interest in the combat employment of ballistic missiles since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the employment of missiles in Yemen added to their body of knowledge concerning such operations.¹³

Yemeni ballistic missiles would subsequently come to the forefront in December 2002 when the DPRK merchant vessel *So-san* was intercepted and temporarily detained by international maritime forces in the Arabian Sea. On board were 15 DPRK manufactured Scud missiles for the Yemeni Government.¹⁴

Vietnam, 1959-1975¹⁵

In 1966 the DPRK publicly declared its support for North Vietnam and its willingness to send troops to assist in the struggle against South Vietnam and the U.S.¹⁶ This support resulted from its national policy to support the “international revolutionary force” of which Vietnam was seen as being a leader.

Publicly, North Vietnam declined these offers for military personnel, but secretly accepted DPRK assistance in two primary areas—pilots and air defense missile personnel.¹⁷ The Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) contingent first arrived in North Vietnam during the later part of 1966 and would remain at least through 1968. The initial contingent, reportedly consisting of over 200 personnel including 25-50 pilots, involved itself with training Vietnamese People’s Air Force (VPAF) pilots and air defense personnel.

KPAF pilots did extremely poorly in Vietnam air combat. The KPAF reportedly lost at least 14 pilots, and possibly as many as 30 MiG-17 and MiG-21 aircraft, due to inexperience and poor training. There were, however, a few exceptions such as Pak Nam-hyong who is reported to have shot down three U.S. planes, for which he was presented with the titles of “Hero of Vietnam” and “Hero of the Republic.”

According to KPAF Major Lee Ch’ol-su (a.k.a., Lee Chul Soo), who defected to the ROK in 1996, a total of “... 800 pilots were sent to Vietnam between 1967 and 1972 in groups of 70 on six-month tours of duty.” Approximately 50 of these pilots, twelve of whom were awarded the title of “Hero of the Republic” for their actions in Vietnam, would form the core of the 203rd Air Regiment of the 3rd Air Combat Division based at Hwangju. This unit’s sole responsibility is the protection of P’yongyang. Pak Nam-hyong would subsequently serve as its commander.

Guerrilla warfare as practiced by the Vietnamese was also of interest to the KPA. Yi Tu-ik (a.k.a., Ri Tu Ik, see

below), who later became a Vice Marshal and member of the KWP Central Military Commission, was sent to Vietnam to serve as an adviser to the Viet Cong during 1967-1968. When he returned his knowledge and experiences were invaluable in developing the *Two Front War* doctrine and influencing special operations in its then current guerrilla war against the ROK.¹⁸

The KPA and KPAF personnel who returned from Vietnam brought with them a broad-spectrum of valuable experiences and knowledge of how the U.S. conducts a modern war. Among the areas were: air combat and air defense experience; electronic warfare (EW) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations; and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). All these experiences and knowledge were utilized to refine the Soviet air and air defense doctrine upon which KPAF then operated.

During the war the VPAF is believed to have provided the KPAF with some access to U.S. aircraft and aviation technology that was shot down or otherwise obtained. With the end of the war in 1975, Vietnam provided considerable quantities of captured U.S. military equipment to the DPRK.¹⁹

Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-Present²⁰

The Arab-Israeli conflicts have provided the DPRK with a wealth of data from which it has gleaned valuable lessons. Some of these lessons have reinforced existing doctrines and tactics while others have been used to evolve new ones.

The DPRK established close diplomatic and military relations with Egypt and Syria during the early 1960s. It has maintained these relations with Syria until today, while those relations with Egypt have become more subdued since the early 1990s.

The KPA would take away many lessons from the 1967 “Six-Day” War. Among these the three most important centered upon Israeli air operations, Israeli armor operations and Soviet defensive tactics.

The pre-emptive Israeli Air Force (IAF) attack on the Arab air forces quickly achieved air superiority, allowing the Israeli Army to operate with relative freedom and with the complete support of the IAF. The concept of a pre-emptive air strike as practiced by the IAF would strongly influence KPAF offensive air doctrine and define operational planning for a long time. This combined with other lessons learned would form the air component of the *All Out War* doctrine in the late 1970s.²¹ The IAF success also emphasized the importance of effective tactical air defense for ground units—reinforcing a lesson learned from the United Nations Command (UNC) during the Fatherland Liberation War.

The speed and effectiveness of Israeli armor operations impressed the KPA. This provided emphasis to the expansion of its armored and motorized forces that was just be-

ginning. It may also have given support to those who believed that a short, fast, war on the Korean Peninsula was feasible.

The KPA evaluated the Arab implementation of Soviet defensive doctrine as flawed and poorly implemented. Aside from these operational matters it perceived that poor training and low morale (i.e., the fighting spirit of the troops) were significant factors in the defeat of the Arab armies.

The DPRK began providing Syria with military assistance during 1966 in the form of approximately 1,200 personnel and 25 KPAF pilots. KPA and KPAF personnel are reported to have been present in Syria during the 1967 War. These personnel, however, were apparently involved only in training operations and there are no reports of any Koreans being encountered by the IDF during the war.

The subsequent War of Attrition during 1968-1970 between Egypt—with Soviet military assistance—and Israel proved valuable to the KPA. It provided an opportunity to closely observe a tightly integrated air defense based upon Soviet equipment and doctrine in operation against a modern and capable enemy. Of interest to the KPAF were the Egyptian modifications to enhance the defense of their air bases (i.e., hardening, dispersal, etc.), and the effectiveness of Israeli air strikes against these new defenses. The lessons learned here were integrated into the KPAF's newly deployed air defense system and reinforced the longtime policy of hardening air bases. Additional lessons learned derived from the War of Attrition are likely to have revolved around special operation forces, SIGINT, EW and the Israeli use of UAVs.

Three years later, on October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. The DPRK lessons learned from the October 1973 War built upon those developed during the War of Attrition and added new ones.

The lessons learned that reinforced or validated KPA doctrine and force structure developments included,

- Reiterated the importance and relevance of surprise in modern warfare. The fact that strategic surprise could be achieved against a vigilant and modern armed force such as the IDF is believed to have been encouraging to the KPA.
- The Arab integrated air defense took a tremendous toll upon the Israeli Air Force during the initial phases of the war, which must have been reassuring to the KPAF, which was operating under similar Soviet based doctrine.
- Both Egypt and Syria made large-scale use of commandos during the early hours of the war to secure bridgeheads and breeches, attack Israeli C³I assets and interdict lines of communications—exactly the missions assigned to KPA special operations forces. While there were some

notable successes (e.g., the Syrian capture of Mount Hermon and the Suez Canal assault crossing) the majority of these missions failed. The KPA probably viewed these operations as an endorsement of evolving its special operations forces and doctrine.

- The successful Egyptian assault crossing and bridging of the Suez Canal utilizing Soviet doctrine and equipment supported the recently begun expansion of KPA engineer river crossing units, equipment and capabilities.

New, and of value to the KPA, were lessons learned concerning the Arab use of man-portable surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs); long-range artillery rockets and ballistic missiles.

- The use of large numbers of shoulder fired SAMs and conventional AAA systems employed by the Arabs, and their apparent effectiveness, apparently led to the subsequent expansion of self-propelled artillery systems and the introduction of a copy of the SA-7 SAM into KPA service.
- The Arab use of ATGMs was a key component of their initial successes against Israeli armor units, it appears that the KPA saw this as an endorsement of the new systems. Since ATGMs, including a copy of the Soviet AT-3 SAGGER, would soon be integrated into the KPA.
- Both the Egyptians and Syrian employed FROG-7 long-range artillery rockets during the war to attack Israeli C³I assets and air bases (the same missions assigned to their KPA counterparts). While these had a mixed result the KPA probably viewed them as supporting current KPA doctrine for their use. The Egyptian employment of three Scud B missiles targeted at the Israeli bridges across the Suez Canal during the last hours of the war was probably noted by the KPA, but is unlikely to have provided much in the way of lessons learned.
- The Israeli's made extensive use of UAVs—especially during the first phases of the war. It is unclear what effect these operations had upon the KPA and KPAF, as it was many years before the DPRK would introduce UAVs into service.
- EW and SIGINT played an important role for all sides during the war. These operations appear to have made an impression on the KPA and were subsequently integrated with other lessons into evolving doctrine.

Unlike the 1967 War, KPA personnel did participate in the October 1973 War. During March 1973, in an effort to strengthen its weak air forces and to internationalize the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt requested direct military assistance from the DPRK. This assistance took the form of a contingent of 30 KPAF pilots under the command of Cho Myong-rok (a.k.a., Jo Myong Rok, see below). According to Major Lee Chol-su these 30 pilots "...were first sent to Moscow, disguised as students going to school there, and then to Egypt."²²

Seven months later, on October 6, 1973, Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack against Israel. During the war, there were unconfirmed reports that KPAF pilots flew defensive combat missions for both Egypt and Syria, and suffered casualties. On the twelfth day of the war, the DPRK announced that it had decided to provide military assistance to both Egypt and Syria. The KPAF contingent in Egypt apparently left shortly after the war. One KPAF defector has stated that a total of 500 KPAF pilots were sent to Egypt and Syria during this period. The experiences of these KPAF personnel were combined with those of personnel returning from the war in Vietnam to refine Soviet based air and air defense doctrine used by the KPAF.

The 1982 Lebanon War (Operation SHALOM GALIL—Peace of the Galilee) illustrated that air superiority is essential on the modern battlefield. Israel made extensive use of EW, SIGINT and UAVs during the war. In the process they quickly decimated the Syrian Air Force, neutralized the Syrian air defense system and inflicted heavy casualties on Palestinian terrorist groups and Syrian ground forces. The apparent ease and speed at which the Israelis accomplished this against an air and air defense system roughly equivalent to the KPAF's own came as a shock. This resulted in the acquisition of, a few years later, of modern Soviet aircraft, radars and EW equipment. It is probable that the war also resulted in KPAF doctrinal changes and was a catalyst in the developing of EW doctrine and operations.

The war, as well as others fought in Lebanon before and after, and the Palestinian Intifada, was probably taken by the KPA as supportive of the total resistance component of *All Out War*.

(To be continued)

Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok ²³

By Michael Madden

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Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok (a.k.a., Cho Myong-rok) is the 1st Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission and director of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) General Political Department. He technically holds the second-most powerful position in the DPRK Government which reflects his three decades at the center of power in the DPRK. Vice Marshal Jo is perhaps most notorious for leading an official DPRK delegation the United States in 2000. VMAR Jo was elected a member of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee (CC KWP) Political Bureau Presidium in September 2010.

Jo Myong Rok was born in 1928. He attended the Manchuria Aviation School and Soviet Air Academy and served as a fighter pilot during the Korean (Victorious Fatherland Liberation) War. He was promoted to Major General in



1954. In 1975 Jo Myong Rok was assigned command of Pyongyang's Air Defense Command. He was promoted to Lieutenant General in 1976. In 1977 he became commanding officer of the KPA Air Force, a position he would hold in 1995.

Jo was elected to full membership on the CC KWP and membership on the Party Central Military Committee at the 6th Party Congress in October 1980. He was elected a deputy to the 7th Supreme People's Assembly in 1982. He was promoted to General in 1992. He was a member of Kim Il Sung's Funeral Committee in July 1994.

In 1995 he was promoted to Vice Marshal and made director of the MPAF General Political Department. In this position Vice Marshal Jo was the primary manager of the political education, indoctrination and surveillance of the military. Jo was elected Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission at the 10th Supreme People's Assembly in September 1998.

VMAR Jo has curtailed his public appearances and activities due to his age. He makes occasional public appearances, and he was elected a member of the CC KWP Political Bureau on 28 September 2010.

Positions

- 1st Vice Chairman, National Defense Commission
- Member, CC KWP Political Bureau Presidium
- Director, General Political Department, KPA
- Member, Party Central Committee (CC KWP)

Career

- 1952-1953: KPA Air Force, Fighter Pilot
- 1954: Promoted, Major General, KPA

- 1975: Commanding Officer, Pyongyang Air Defense Command
- 1976: Promoted, Lieutenant General, KPA
- 1977: Appointed, Commanding Officer, KPA Air Force
- 1980: Elected, Member, CC KWP
- Elected, Member, Central Military Committee, CC KWP
- 1982: Deputy, 7th SPA
- Awarded, Order of Kim il Sung
- 1985: Promoted, Colonel General, KPA
- 1986: Deputy, 8th SPA
- 1990: Deputy, 9th SPA
- 1992: Promoted, General, KPA
- 1994: Member, Kim Il Sung Funeral Committee
- 1995: Promoted, Vice Marshal, KPA
- Appointed, Director General, Political Bureau, KPA
- 1998: Deputy, 10th SPA
- Elected Vice Chairman, NDC
- 2003: Deputy, 11th SPA
- 2009: Deputy, 12th SPA
- 2010: Elected, Member, CC KWP Political Bureau Presidium

Vice Marshal Ri Tu Ik ²⁴

By Michael Madden

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Vice Marshal Ri Tu Ik (a.k.a., Yi Tu-ik) was a late member of the Party Central Military Commission and a 1st generation DPRK elite and military leader who helped establish Kim Jong Il's succession system in the 1970s and 1980s. VMAR Ri was former commanding officer of the Pyongyang Defense Corps (Capital Defense Corps), chief of the General Staff Operations Bureau, and former area (region) and corps commander. Ri's ties to the Kim Family extended to the 1930s when he served under Kim Il Sung in Jilin, PRC. He was an expert in combined arms and guerrilla warfare, and one of the primary architects of the DPRK's military doctrine.

Ri Tuk Il was born in Jilin Province in 1921. He joined the partisan campaign in the 1930s as a member of Kim Il Sung's security escort. He received guerilla training, in Northeast China. He later conducted reconnaissance operations against Japan in and around Jilin Province and North Hamgyong, as a member of the Russians' 88th Special Reconnaissance Brigade. Around 1945 he rejoined Kim Il Sung' security escort as platoon commander and, in 1948, company commander.

During the Korean (Victorious Fatherland Liberation) War, Ri served as a battalion commander. From 1954 to 1958 he received professional military education in Russia from 1954 to 1958 with a concentration in joint warfare and special operations. Upon his return to the DPRK he was

assigned command of the 3rd Regiment. He was later appointed deputy commander of the 9th Infantry Division. He was promoted to commanding officer of the 9th Infantry Division in 1962, as well as being elected for the first as a deputy to the Supreme People's Assembly.

In the 1963 he was promoted to Lieutenant General and became chief of what is currently the General Staff Department's Operations Bureau. From 1965 to 1973 he served as commanding officer of the VII Army Corps. From 1967 to 1968 Ri served as an advisor to the Viet Cong. He participated in the removal of the country's defense managers in the late 1960s. Ri was promoted to Colonel General in 1968 elected to full membership on the Party Central Committee at the 5th Party Congress in November 1970.

From 1973 to 1976 Ri Tu Ik served as commander of the II Army Group. From 1977 to 1980 Ri commanded the II Army Corps. He was elected a member of the Central Military Commission at the 6th Party Congress in October 1980. In the early 1980s Ri commanded the IV Army Corps. In 1985 he was promoted to General. From the late 1980s to 1992 Ri was commander of the Pyongyang Defense Corps.

Ri Tu Ik was promoted to Vice Marshal in April 1992. He remained active in DPRK political life as a member of the Central Military Commission and advisor to Kim Jong Il. He received medical treatment in the PRC in 1997. Ri made his final public appearance in 1999. He passed away in 2002 and was buried in the Patriotic Martyrs Cemetery in Ryongsong District in Pyongyang. On 13 September 2002 KCNA reported that Ri Tu Ik's remains were buried and a monumental bust constructed at the Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery on Mount Taesong in Pyongyang.

Positions

- Member, Party Central Military Committee
- Member, Party Central Committee (CC KWP)

Career

- 1938: Member, Kim Il Sung Security Escort (Jilin, PRC)
- 1941: 88th Special Reconnaissance Brigade (USSR)
- 1945: Anjin Military Academy (PRC)
- Platoon Commander, Kim Il Sung Security Escort
- 1948: Company Commander, Kim Il Sung Security Escort
- 1950: Battalion Commander
- 1954: Professional Military Education (USSR)
- 1958: Commanding Officer, 3rd Regiment
- Commanding Officer, 9th Infantry Division
- 1962: Commanding Officer, 3rd Infantry Division
- Deputy, 3rd Supreme People's Assembly (SPA)
- 1963 (ca.): Director, General Staff Department's Operations Bureau
- 1965: Promoted, Lieutenant General

- Commanding officer, VII Army Corps
- 1967: Advisor and instructor to the Viet Cong
- Deputy, 4th SPA
- 1968: Awarded Hero of the Republic (Order of National Flag, 1st Class)
- 1970: Elected, Member, CC KWP
- 1972: Deputy, 5th SPA
- 1973: Promoted, Colonel General
- Commanding Officer, II Army Group
- 1977: Commanding Officer, II Army Corps
- 1980: Elected, Member, Party Central Military Commission
- Commanding Officer, IV Army Corps
- 1982: Deputy, 7th SPA
- Awarded, Order of Kim Il Sung
- 1985: Promoted, General
- 1986 (ca.): Commanding Officer, Pyongyang Defense Command
- Deputy, 8th SPA
- 1990: Deputy, 9th SPA
- 1992: Promoted, Vice Marshal
- Awarded, Double Hero
- Military Advisor to Kim Jong Il
- 1994: Member, Kim Il Sung Funeral Committee
- 1995: Member, O Jin U Funeral Committee
- 1997: Choe Kwang Funeral Committee
- Kim Kwang Jin Funeral Committee

Editor's Note

In this issue *KPA Journal* I'm beginning a series surveying the "lessons learned" by the KPA from their analysis of foreign conflicts. While the preeminent factor influencing KPA force structure, weapons acquisition, tactics and doctrine has been their experiences during the Fatherland Liberation War, these lessons have had greater significance than normally assumed.

A number of readers have expressed a strong interest in U.S./ROK/UNC special operations during the Korean War. While this fascinating subject will not be directly addressed in *KPA Journal* I would like to recommend several excellent sources which I have recently read or reread (I will eventually create a bibliography for this subject on the *KPA Journal* website),

- *Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History* has written a number of excellent accounts of special operations and unit histories during the Korean War. In fact, in honor of the 60th Anniversary of the war, the two most recent issues (Vo. 6, Nos. 1 & 2) are dedicated to coverage of the war.
- Michael E. Haas, *In the Devil's Shadow: UN Special Operations During the Korean War*, ISBN 1557503443.

- Ed Evanhoe, *Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War*, ISBN 1557502463.
- Richard Kiper has recently written a history of the 1st Raider Company which will be published by Kent State University Press in 2011.
- A member of the 1st Raider Company, Lee Broussard, recently had an article written about his experiences in Korea. It can be found at, http://www.abbeyillnow.com/view/full_story/9604676/article-Korea-s-cold-sticks-with-former-Raider-60-years-later?instance=secondary_news_state_left_column

As noted in the September issue I was going to speak at the September 1st Marine Corps University conference *Confronting Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula*. The conference went well and readers can find video of the various panels on C-Span at, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/295283-3>.

Readers will notice that Michael Madden has graciously agreed to contribute two biographies of KPA leaders from his *North Korea Leadership Watch* website (<http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/>). The website has a wealth of excellent biographic and organizational information concerning the DPRK leadership and Michael updates it on a regular basis. I have both valued and enjoyed Michael's work for some time and would encourage readers interested in DPRK leadership matters to visit his website.

I have received several emails from readers expressing some annoyance over the irregular publication schedule and the fact that I have not gone into greater depth in some of the articles. I have explained to these readers, and I would like to repeat it here, that I produce *KPA Journal* in my spare time. While I would like to have a position which affords me the opportunity to work on KPA related issues (and thus *KPA Journal*)—as well as ballistic missile development in the Third World—full time, I simply do not have that luxury at the present. Perhaps, in the future but until that time I ask for everyone's indulgence.

A beta version of the *KPA Journal* website has been completed and the website should go live shortly. I will let the readers know when it does.

Please feel free to share *KPA Journal* with colleagues and friends. If they'd like to keep receiving the journal please have them email me and I will add them to the mailing list.

I would like to thank all readers who have taken time to email me with corrections, clarifications, comments and ideas for articles in future issues of *KPA Journal*. Keep them coming.

—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Endnotes

I would like to thank Dr. Jo Dong-joon, Mr. Michael Madden and Mr. Dwight Rider for their assistance with various aspects in the preparation of this issue of KPA Journal.

- ¹ This article draws heavily both upon interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. *The Armed Forces of North Korea*. London: I.B. Taurus, 2001, pp. 123-160.
- ² *Defense White Paper, 1993–1994*. Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1994, p. 72
- ³ Many of these missions which would be described as humanitarian in the West fall under what the DPRK describes as *Indok* (i.e., benevolent virtue) or *Kwangpok* (i.e., wide-range or expansive) politics.
- ⁴ “Russian Reporter in DPRK on Nuclear, Abduction Issues, Ties With Russia,” *Gendai*, April 1, 2005, pp. 102-110, *Open Source Center*.
- ⁵ The Research Institute for Military Sciences is sometimes identified as belonging to the Military Science Bureau. It is unclear if the later is simply a different name for the Military Training Bureau or a separate organization. The precise manner in which the Research Institute for Military Sciences interfaces with the Second Academy of Defense Sciences is unknown. Other research institutes which are sometimes mentioned within the context of “lessons learned” include the: No. 15 Technology Institute (reportedly concerned with ROK operations); and the Chuche Tactics Research Institute. The No. 15 Technology Institute may possibly be the 8.15 Technology Institute.
- ⁶ “DPRK Military Studies Merging of East, West German Armies,” *Choson Ilbo*, April 25, 1997, p. 2, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*.
- ⁷ Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; “Lessons for DPRK From NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia,” *Nodong Simun*, 20 April 1999, p. 1, *Open Source Center*; “DPRK’s Keen Interest in New Weapons Used in Yugoslavia,” *Yonhap*, 13 May 1999; and “Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization,” *Sisa Journal*, June 6, 1996, pp. 30-31, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*.
- ⁸ As cited in “South Army Official Looks at DPRK’s Weapons,” *Kukbang Kwa Kisul*, January 1989, pp. 102-113, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*.
- ⁹ “North Korea Claims to Have Aided Cuba in 1962 Missile Crisis,” *Yonhap*, July 9, 2001; Sung-joo, “North Korea’s Security Policy and Military Strategy,” in Scalapino, Robert A. and Kim, Jun-yop, editors, *North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues*. Berkeley: University of California, 1983, 144-163.
- ¹⁰ As quoted in *Inside North Korea: Three Decades of Duplicity*, Seoul: Institute of Internal and External Affairs, July 1975, pp. 43-45.
- ¹¹ Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and McGregor, Andrew. *Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War*. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2006.
- ¹² Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
- ¹³ Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. “Yemen Continues Ballistic Missile Procurement Programme,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, April 2003, <http://jir.janes.com>.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ The subject of DPRK involvement in the Vietnam War will be covered in a future *KPA Journal* article. Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; “Ex-DPRK Officer on Military,” *Wolgan Choson*, August 1999, pp. 62-96, *Open Source Center*; Sewell, Stephen L. *History of the VPAF*, unpublished manuscript, 1998; and “N Korea-Vietnam-Pilot,” *Associated Press*, September 14, 1998.
- ¹⁶ “North Korea Offers Volunteers,” *New York Times*, July 19, 1966, p. 4; “Won’t Seek Outside Help, North Vietnam Paper Hints,” *New York Times*, July 5, 1966, p. 2; and “North Korea Again Says it Will Supply ‘Volunteers,’” *New York Times*, July 3, 1966, p. 12.
- ¹⁷ The DPRK also sent a number of intelligence and special operations personnel, as well as small quantities of weapons, munitions and small naval craft.
- ¹⁸ “DPRK Vice Marshal Yi Tu-ik Profiled,” *Chungang Ilbo*, August 4, 2000, *Open Source Center*.
- ¹⁹ The KPAF may have received 1-2 examples of former RVNAF F-5E Tiger II fighters, UH-1D helicopters and miscellaneous equipment.
- ²⁰ Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.; Cordesman, Anthony H. and Wagner, Abraham R. *The Lessons of Modern War: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991; Herzog, Chaim. *The Arab-Israeli Wars*. New York: Random House, 1982; and Dupuy, Trevor N. *Evasive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947-1974*. New York: Harpor & Row, 1978.
- ²¹ Interview data acquired by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
- ²² “N Korea-Vietnam-Pilot,” *Associated Press*, September 14, 1998.
- ²³ Michael Madden is the editor of *North Korean Leadership Watch* (<http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/>). <http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/leadership-biographies/vmar-jo-myong-rok/>; Chong, Bong-uk (editor). *A Handbook on North Korea* (Seoul: Naewoe Press, November 1998) p. 75; “Narrative Biographies of DPRK Figures” *Sindong-a* (Seoul: January 1995) pp. 210-278, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*; and Yonhap News Agency. *North Korea Handbook* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2003) pp. 655; 809-10.
- ²⁴ Michael Madden is the editor of *North Korean Leadership Watch* (<http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/>). <http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/leadership-biographies/vmar-ri-tu-ik-1921-2002/>; “Abbreviated Profiles of 200 DPRK Figures,” *Sindong-a*, January 1995, pp. 593-608, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*; “DPRK Vice Marshal Yi Tu-ik Profiled,” *Chungang Ilbo*, August, 4, 2000; Kim Tu-hwan, “DPRK’s ‘First Generation’ of Revolution Fades Away,” *Yonhap*, March 16, 2002; and Yonhap News Agency. *North Korea Handbook*. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2003.